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ONLINE THREATS: THE DIRE NEED FOR A
REBOOT IN TRUE-THREATS JURISPRUDENCE
John Sivils*
Free speech protection ends where true threats begin. 1 The Supreme Court of
the United States has defined “true threats” as “those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act
of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”2 However,
the Court has not meaningfully expounded on the true-threats doctrine since
Black, leaving federal circuits split on the meaning of intent in a true-threat
analysis.3 State high courts have further muddled the intent question in truethreats jurisprudence by adopting analytical standards that differ from the federal
appellate circuits in which they sit.4
The First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits apply an
objective test, asking how the alleged threat would be construed by either a
reasonable speaker or a reasonable listener. 5 The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits also
apply an objective test but do not consider the perspective of the speaker or
listener. 6 Conversely, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits evaluate whether the speaker
had subjective intent to intimidate a person or group of persons,7 with the Ninth
Circuit further specifying that some threat statutes require both an objective and
subjective analysis while others only require a subjective analysis. 8
Within this milieu, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Knox
correctly upheld the criminal conviction of Pittsburgh rapper Jamal Knox for

* J.D. Candidate at SMU Dedman School of Law graduating in May 2020. John earned a
Bachelor of Arts in English from Ouachita Baptist University in Arkadelphia, Arkansas. John would
like to thank his wife Mary, and his parents Paul and Jennifer Sivils, for constantly pushing him to
pursue every opportunity with hard work and dedication.
1. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
2. Id.
3. United States v. Clemens, 738 F.3d 1, 2–3 (1st Cir. 2013).
4. See Clay Calvert et. al., Rap Music and the True Threats Quagmire: When Does One Man’s Lyric
Become Another’s Crime?, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 10–11 (2014).
5. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1163 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1163–64.
8. United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1117 (9th Cir. 2011).
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terroristic threats and witness intimidation based solely on Knox’s rap song. 9 The
Commonwealth brought these charges against Knox after Pittsburgh police
officers scheduled to testify against Knox discovered a music video titled “F--k the
Police” posted on Facebook.10 The first verse of the song, sung by Knox, featured
violent statements directed at Pittsburgh Detective Daniel Zeltner and Police
Officer Michael Kosko. 11 Knox’s specific mention of Zeltner and Kosko appeared
motivated by the officers’ recent arrest of Knox for drug-related crimes. 12
In a bench trial, the trial court rejected Knox’s argument that his rap song was
constitutionally protected speech on the grounds that the song was a true threat
falling outside the scope of First Amendment protection.13 Knox appealed to the
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, which affirmed on the issue of Knox’s intent to
threaten but did not conduct a true-threat analysis.14
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Knox’s appeal to address whether
the music video had any First Amendment protection.15 Although the court
correctly found that Knox intended to threaten or intimidate at least Zeltner and
Kosko,16 it incorrectly stated that it was adopting a purely subjective test for
intent. 17 Moreover, the court’s holding that Black “allows states to criminalize
threatening speech which is specifically intended to terrorize or intimidate”18 does
not give lower courts any guidance on whether a high-level mens rea, such as
specific intent, is required to keep a speech-restricting statute from running afoul
of the First Amendment, or whether a lower mens rea, such as recklessness or
knowing, suffices.
After giving an overview of the Supreme Court’s two main cases on true
threats—Watts v. United States 19 and Virginia v. Black—and explaining the current
circuit split on the issue of intent, 20 the court stated that Black required an
“inquiry into the speaker’s mental state”21 and a weighing of the contextual factors
laid out in Watts. 22 The court understood its consideration of contextual factors
as a means of interpreting the speaker’s subjective intent. 23 Through this lens, the
court first considered the lyrics of the song and the sound effects in the music to
find that the music video was threatening and that directing threats to officers by

9. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1161 (majority opinion).
10. Id. at 1150.
11. Id. at 1149.
12. Id. at 1159.
13. Id. at 1151.
14. See id. at 1151–52 (citing Commonwealth v. Knox, No. 1136 WDA 2014, 2016 WL
5379299, at *5 (Pa. Super. Ct. Aug. 2, 2016) (slip op.)).
15. Id. at 1152.
16. See id. at 1160–61.
17. See id. at 1156–57.
18. Id. at 1158.
19. See id. at 1155 (“The true-threat doctrine has its genesis in the Watts case.”); see also Watts v.
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (“What is a threat must be distinguished from
what is constitutionally protected speech.”).
20. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1155–56.
21. Id. at 1157.
22. Id. at 1159.
23. See id.
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name in the song evinced Knox’s subjective intent to threaten those officers. 24
In its Watts analysis, the court considered the conditionality of the threats,
whether the threatened officers had reason to believe that Knox was capable of
engaging in violence, how the officers reacted to the threats, and whether the
threats were communicated directly to the officers. 25 The court found that the
threats were unconditional, that the presence of a gun at Knox’s recent arrest gave
the officers reason to believe that Knox was capable of engaging in violence, that
the officers reacted to the music video by relocating and leaving the police force,
and that the posting of the video online was the equivalent of communicating
directly to the officers.26 Before stating its holding, the court mentioned possible
concerns of criminalizing artistic speech, especially in a genre pervaded by violent
language. 27 Despite these valid concerns, the court found that calling out officers
by name and referencing a recent altercation with those officers took Knox’s rap
song out of the artistic realm and into the realm of true threats. 28 Thus, the court
affirmed Knox’s conviction29 and expressly declined to clarify the necessary mens
rea to sustain a true-threat conviction.30
Although the majority’s failure to clarify all aspects of the true-threats doctrine
might have been prudent in this case,31 this type of minimalism has “thwarted the
advancement and coherence of First Amendment doctrine.” 32 Despite the fact
that the true-threats doctrine “screams out the loudest for clarification” above all
other First Amendment doctrines,33 the Supreme Court of the United States
explicitly refused to address any First Amendment concerns in its most recent
foray into true-threats jurisprudence in Elonis v. United States. 34 Moreover, the
Court’s holding regarding the mens rea required to result in criminal punishment—
that a negligence standard would not suffice—only applies in the context of a
specific federal statute criminalizing true threats. 35 Since the Court found that the
statute at issue criminalized specific intent to threaten, it pointedly refused to be
the first court to consider whether a recklessness mens rea could be punished.36
This minimalist approach, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court followed in
Knox, leaves lower courts without an analytical framework to determine the mens
rea required for analogous state statutes criminalizing certain speech. As a result,

24. Id. at 1159–60.
25. Id. at 1160.
26. Id. at 1159–60.
27. See id. at 1160 (citing Andrea L. Dennis, Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music Lyrics as Art, Life, and
Criminal Evidence, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 23 (2007)).
28. Id. at 1160–61.
29. Id. at 1161.
30. See id. at 1157 n.10.
31. See id. at 1162 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Clay Calvert & Matthew D. Bunker, Fissures, Fractures & Doctrinal Drifts: Paying the Price in
First Amendment Jurisprudence for a Half Decade of Avoidance, Minimalism & Partisanship, 24 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 943, 950–51 (2016).
33. Id. at 957.
34. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012 (2015) (“Given our disposition, it is not necessary to consider any
First Amendment issues.”).
35. Id. at 2011 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012)).
36. Id. at 2013.
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true-threats jurisprudence continues to become more muddled with each new
case.
Despite the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s failure to use Knox to clarify the
question of mens rea in a subjective true-threat analysis for Pennsylvania courts,
the court correctly found that the United States Supreme Court’s holding in
Virginia v. Black mandated a subjective inquiry into the speaker’s mind.37 While
some criticize the subjective-intent approach on the grounds that it puts a greater
burden on the prosecution, 38 an increased burden in itself is not facially
undesirable. Heightening the burden necessary to regulate pure speech would
help ensure that civil tort standards, such as negligence, do not creep into criminal
jurisprudence, 39 especially in an area as sensitive as regulation of speech. Such a
prosecutorial burden in the regulation of speech falls in line with the general
requirement of criminal law that the accused must have a culpable mens rea. 40
Additionally, the heightened subjective burden would promote the Black Court’s
philosophy that “the hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow ‘free
trade in ideas’—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find
distasteful or discomforting.”41 A purely objective test would favor this
“overwhelming majority” by disregarding the speaker’s interest in communicating
freely, however crude her method of doing so might be.42
Requiring the highest level of mens rea—specific intent to threaten—would not
offend the objectives of criminal law in light of First Amendment concerns. Justice
Wecht’s concurring and dissenting opinion in Knox accurately points out that
punishing speech, even true threats, is an exception to the general First
Amendment prohibition against regulating content of speech.43 Such regulations
must be narrowly drawn.44 The less rigorous the mens rea standard, the more likely
the regulation is not narrowly drawn. Thus, a heightened mens rea standard would
rein in government imposition of content-based restrictions.
Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court purported to undertake only a
subjective inquiry into the speaker’s intent, 45 the court implicitly applied an
objective, reasonable-listener test as well through its incorporation of contextual
factors in the intent analysis.46 The court noted that these contextual factors
include “whether the victim had reason to believe the speaker had a propensity to
engage in violence, and how the listeners reacted to the speech.” 47 The court
37. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1156–57 (Pa. 2018).
38. Paul T. Crane, Note, “True Threats” and the Issue of Intent, 92 VA. L. REV . 1225, 1273 (2006).
39. P. Brooks Fuller, Evaluating Intent in True Threats Cases: The Importance of Context in Analyzing
Threatening Internet Messages, 37 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 37, 47 (2015).
40. Id. at 45–46; see also Calvert & Bunker, supra note 32, at 60.
41. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
42. Crane, supra note 38, at 1272.
43. Commonwealth v. Knox, 190 A.3d 1146, 1164 (Pa. 2018) (Wecht, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
44. Id. (citing Chaplinksy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
45. See id. at 1157–58 (majority opinion).
46. See id. at 1158.
47. Id. at 1159 (quoting J.S. ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 858 (Pa.
2002), abrogated by Knox, 190 A.3d at 1146).
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found that the presence of a firearm at the scene of Knox’s prior arrest for drug
charges was relevant in determining whether the officers had reason to believe
that Knox would actually engage in violence.48 Stated differently, the court
considered how the officers as reasonable listeners would interpret Knox’s
statements in the music video in light of the gun’s presence at the scene of his
recent arrest. This analysis shows that the court not only considered Knox’s
mental state in delivering speech but also how such speech would be viewed by a
reasonable listener under the relevant circumstances.
The court further injected objective, reasonable-listener standards into its
contextual analysis by emphasizing the way the officers reacted to the video. The
court noted that the officer who discovered the video “did not see it as mere satire
or social commentary”49 and that Zeltner and Kosko undertook drastic measures
to ensure their own safety, such as resigning from the police force, moving to new
residences, and obtaining security details.50 The court also pointed to evidence
from the song’s lyrics that one of Knox’s friends warned against publishing the
song, 51 showing that other listeners believed the statements to be legitimate
threats. Although the court did not expressly state that a reasonable listener’s
understanding of the speech matters for its analysis, it nonetheless considered the
listeners’ interpretation of the music video. Notably, the court also gave much
weight to the actual effect the speech had on the officers, 52 reflecting the idea that
criminal punishment generally should stand only if the victim suffers actual
harm.53 In this case, as in all true-threats cases, the harm suffered by the listeners
was the fear of violence. 54 Clearly, consideration of both a reasonable listener’s
understanding of speech as well as the objective effect of speech on the actual
listeners permeated the court’s analysis under the guise of contextual factors.
In conducting their analyses, both the majority in Knox and Justice Wecht gave
some consideration to the peculiarities of the medium of communication—rap
music.55 The majority did not provide much in-depth analysis regarding rap 56 but
did recognize characteristics of the genre that should be taken into account in
analyzing this type of communication. 57 The majority concluded, however, that
Knox’s calling out of officers by name and the reference to Knox’s recent arrest
48. Id. at 1160.
49. Id. at 1159.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1158.
52. See id. at 1160–61.
53. See generally Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results
of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497 (1974).
54. Crane, supra note 38, at 1269–70 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388
(1992)).
55. See Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Brief of Amici Curiae Michael
Render (“Killer Mike”) et al. in Support of Petitioner at 17–19, Knox v. Commonwealth, 139 S. Ct.
1547 (2019) (No. 18-949), 2019 WL 1115837, at *17–19 (expounding on these peculiarites), cert.
denied, 139 S. Ct. at 1547.
56. For more on the history of rap and the genre’s interactions with the American legal system,
see ERIK NIELSON & ANDREA L. DENNIS, RAP ON TRIAL : RACE, LYRICS, AND GUILT IN AMERICA
59–74 (2019).
57. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160; see also NIELSON & DENNIS, supra note 56, at 48–58 (discussing
elements of rap music critical to properly analyzing the genre).
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removed the lyrics from the realm of fiction into autobiography.58 Although it can
be difficult to distinguish between true threats and fictional grandstanding in a
genre laden with over-the-top violent imagery, the majority’s reliance on the
personal nature of the song provides a logically sound line between fictional
puffery and factual threats.
Another contextual aspect of the medium the court did not adequately analyze
is that Knox’s music video was posted online, not sent directly to the Pittsburgh
police. Online speech differs primarily from in-person speech due to
decontextualization that occurs when the communication is not experienced in a
social setting. 59 Although the effect this difference should have on the analysis is
outside the scope of this note, courts should at least consider the fundamental
peculiarities of Internet communications in a true-threat analysis due to the
development of online speech avenues. Internet use has exploded since Black,60
which did not consider Internet communication at all. As cases regarding
threatening Internet speech proliferate, 61 courts will need to resist judicial
minimalism and adapt Black to the modern age.
One concern is that Internet communications are often not directed at the
subject of the communication—or at anyone for that matter—yet are still viewed
by millions. For example, tweets do not necessarily have to be directed at anyone
in particular. In fact, most social media sites do not require communications to
be directed at anyone. Both the majority and Justice Wecht in Knox pointed to
the public accessibility of the music video as sufficient to find that Knox intended
for the named law enforcement officers to see the video. 62 Although such a
conclusion may be warranted, it is troubling that the court provides almost no
analysis on this issue. This conclusion reeks of strict liability, which has no place
in the criminalization of speech. The aforementioned concern of requiring greater
protection for speech regulations would seem to necessitate a stricter showing of
directly communicating a threat to the recipient, especially since common sense
would indicate that threatening speech delivered online, however extreme, is
much less likely to intimidate a reasonable listener who is not interacting face-toface with the speaker.
Although the majority of courts do not apply both objective and subjective
analyses in all true-threats cases, some legal scholarship argues for an objective and
subjective analysis of Internet communication.63 The dual analysis proposed
herein, however, should not apply exclusively to Internet communications.
Rather, this dual analysis can accomplish much more than merely contextualizing
threatening communication. This approach would ensure the most equitable
58. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1159–61.
59. Fuller, supra note 39, at 53.
60. See Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000–2015, PEW RES. CTR.
(June 26, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access2000-2015/ [https://perma.cc/WP6T-64MC].
61. Fuller, supra note 39, at 49.
62. Knox, 190 A.3d at 1160; id. at 1168–69 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
63. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and the Jurisprudence of the
Federal Criminal Law, 2002 B.Y.U. L. REV. 829, 1076–77; Fuller, supra note 39, at 75.
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balancing of interests as to any type of speech. The chief interests at issue,
recognized by both legal scholars and judges, include an individual’s autonomy
interest to form thoughts and beliefs for himself or herself free of government
interference 64 and the listener’s interest in being free from the fear of violence.65
The dual analysis would compel courts to highly scrutinize regulations of speech
and lead to a thoughtful balancing of these interests.
While some propose leaving the entire analysis exclusively in the hands of
judges, 66 such an approach would doubtless lead to further muddying of truethreats jurisprudence. If the question of whether certain speech is a true threat is
left to juries, courts would only need to ensure that juries receive proper
instructions, which would require findings on the speaker’s subjective intent, the
objective effect on a reasonable listener, and the actual effect on the actual
listener. If the question is left to courts, then courts will be required to develop
methods of analyzing facts, which would open more avenues for division among
circuits and states as to how certain facts should be interpreted by judges.
Although submitting the question of whether certain speech is a true threat to
juries may lead to divergent outcomes (i.e., different juries could come to different
findings based on the same set of facts), it would at least lead to consistent
application of the law. Thus, on review, appellate courts could defer to district
courts’ findings of fact in true-threats cases, ensuring a clear line between
adjudication of law and finding of fact.
In cases of threats made online as allegedly artistic speech, as in Knox, courts
must further refine their jury instructions to require findings on the specificity of
threats. Courts must also admit evidence for juries to consider regarding the
peculiarities of the artistic genre at issue, as well as the peculiarities of speech
communicated on the Internet. Such evidence would be most relevant in an
objective analysis.
Between the majority’s and Justice Wecht’s opinions in Knox, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court provided the optimal framework to analyze true threats in the
context of artistic speech posted online. As expressly detailed by Justice Wecht
and implicitly adopted by the majority, the question of intent to threaten should
consider the speaker’s subjective intent, a reasonable listener’s objective
interpretation of the communication, and the objective effect of the
communication on the actual listener. 67 The subjective analysis should require
the prosecution to prove specific intent to threaten, the highest mens rea, to ensure
that content-based speech regulations are kept narrow so as to respect the
autonomy of speakers and listeners to engage in conversation without
interference. 68 The objective analysis will ensure that speakers are not punished
for speech that would not have reasonably resulted in harm and did not in fact
64. Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1255, 1279 (2014).
65. Crane, supra note 38, at 1270.
66. E.g., Blakey & Murray, supra note 63, at 1052 (arguing that judges are more neutral and
more sensitive to First Amendment concerns than juries).
67. See Knox, 190 A.3d at 1165 (Wecht, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing J.S.
ex. rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 858 (Pa. 2002), abrogated by Knox, 190 A.3d
at 1146).
68. See id.
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result in harm. In both instances, the question of intent should be resolved by the
trier of fact so as to lead to consistent application of the law. This approach would
ensure a robust balancing of a speaker’s interest in speech autonomy with the
listener’s interest in being free from fear caused by threatening speech 69 while also
providing much-needed clarity and modernization to true-threats jurisprudence.

69. See Alexander Tsesis, Deliberative Democracy, Truth, and Holmesian Social Darwinism, 72 SMU
L. REV . 495, 510 (2019) (“The task of free speech theory is to articulate the conditions for robust
debate, cathartic expression, and informative communication, while defining narrowly tailored
regulations that punish linguistic conduct that is intentionally threatening to individuals and groups
or inciting of others to harm them.”).

